An evaluation of transmission routes for low pathogenicity avian influenza virus among chickens sold in live bird markets  by Yee, Karen S. et al.
Virology 394 (2009) 19–27
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Virology
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r.com/ locate /yv i roAn evaluation of transmission routes for low pathogenicity avian inﬂuenza virus
among chickens sold in live bird markets
Karen S. Yee a, Tim E. Carpenter a, Thomas B. Farver b, Carol J. Cardona b,c,⁎
a Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS), Department of Medicine and Epidemiology, School of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
b Department of Population Health and Reproduction, University of California Davis, CA, USA
c Veterinary Medicine Extension, University of California Davis, CA, USA⁎ Corresponding author. Department of Populatio
Veterinary Medicine Extension, University of Californi
Rm. 1383 Surge III, CA 95616, USA. Fax: +1 530 752 75
E-mail address: cjcardona@ucdavis.edu (C.J. Cardona
0042-6822/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. A
doi:10.1016/j.virol.2009.08.017a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 3 February 2009
Returned to author for revision
16 March 2009
Accepted 7 August 2009
Available online 10 September 2009
Keywords:
Low pathogenicity avian inﬂuenza
Live bird market
H6N2
Virus transmission
Poultry
Poultry diseases
Indirect contactMany theories about the modes of avian inﬂuenza virus (AIV) transmission have been proposed, but few
have been quantiﬁed, and none within a ﬂock or live bird market (LBM) setting where birds are often kept in
stacked cages. We describe a novel experimental design and the results collected for the purpose of
estimating transmission rates speciﬁc to the potential modes of AIV transmission within an LBM. Chickens of
the strains and ages found in California LBMs were inoculated with low pathogenicity AIV H6N2. Aerosol
exposure was found to be the most important route of transmission for this H6N2 AIV. The handling of
infectious chickens resulted in the transmission of H6N2 AIV, though the virus was not detectible by rRT-PCR.
Chickens with fecal exposure to infected birds (median=8.0 DPI) had detectable virus earlier than in those
with aerosol exposure only (median=10.0 DPI). Changes in the hemagglutinin sequence were not found to
be associated with oropharyngeal or cloacal shedding in this study.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs) are enveloped, single-stranded,
negative-sense RNA viruses of the Orthomyxoviridae that can cause
disease in humans, poultry, and wild birds (Cardona et al., 2009;
Swayne and Halvorson, 2003). Despite the involvement of live bird
markets (LBMs) in many AIV epidemics worldwide (Senne et al.,
1992; Swayne and Halvorson, 2003; Webster, 2004) little is known
about how AIV spreads within an LBM. A better understanding of AIV
transmission and spread is necessary to plan efﬁcient and successful
control and eradication programs. In previous studies of direct and
indirect contact AIV transmission, (Alexander et al., 1978; Perez et al.,
2003; Samadieh and Bankowski, 1971) either insufﬁcient numbers of
birds were used, or study designs prevented accurate and precise
estimations of transmission rates.
Though AIV transmission has been demonstrated by direct contact
in other studies (Alexander et al., 1986; Lu and Castro, 2004; van der
Goot et al., 2003), previous studies have not attempted to measure
transmission rates by indirect routes in environments such as LBMs,
where birds are usually kept in stacked cages and most AIV
transmission will be via indirect contact, such as aerosol and fecaln Health and Reproduction,
a Davis, One Shields Avenue,
63.
).
ll rights reserved.exposures. The roles of aerosol and fecal exposures have been
examined in other studies (Alexander et al., 1978; Perez et al., 2003),
but indirect exposures in large populations and their combined effect
on AIV transmission have not been examined. Another mode of
indirect exposure for birds in LBMs is via contaminated fomites, like
the gloves, aprons, and rubber boots worn by LBM employees while
handling birds. Tiwari et al. (2006) demonstrated that AIV virus can
remain viable on non-porous materials after contamination. In that
study, materials such as latex gloves, gumboots, cotton ﬁber, feathers
and plastics were contaminated with a 6.3×106 tissue culture
infections dose (TCID)50/ml of AIV H13N7, and approximately 102–
103 infectious virus particles were recovered 0–72 h post-contamina-
tion. However; an experiment to estimate the transmission of AIV
surviving on these materials to chickens was not conducted.
This study was designed to collect the data needed to quantify the
transmission rate of AIV among birds in an LBM, which are commonly
kept in cages and do not have homogeneous contacts. We used
chickens of the types commonly sold in LBMs,with anovel studydesign
mimicking the direct and indirect routes common in an LBM setting, to
study the transmission of A/chicken/California/1772/02 (H6N2).
Results
No signs of disease were observed prior to necropsy in any birds in
either trial. Splenomegaly (n=21 and 20 chickens in trials 1 and 2,
respectively) was the most common lesion observed in infected
Table 1
Daily rRT-PCR and log 2 HI results for trials 1 and 2.
Trial 2—without trays between cages rRT-PCR (DPI) HI log2
(DPI)
Cage Handling order Contact type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 14
Stack 1 A 1 Aerosol – – – – – – – – r – r r r, c r – – 0 6
Aerosol – – – – – – – – r r r r r r – – 0 7
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – r r r r – c – 0 0
Aerosol – – – – – – – r r r – r, c r, c r c – 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – r r r r, c r, c r, c c – 0 8
Z 4 Inoculated – – r r – r r – – – – – – – – – 0 11
Inoculated – – – r r r r – – – – – – – – – 0 10
Inoculated – – – r r r r – – – – – – – – – 0 10
Inoculated – – – r r r r – – – – – – – – – 0 10
Inoculated – – – r r r r r, c c – – r – c – – 0 11
B 8 Aerosol, fecal – – – – - r r r r r r, c r – - – – 0 13
Aerosol, fecal – – – – r r r, c r, c – – – – – – – – 0 11
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – r r r r c – – – – – – 0 12
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – r r r r – c – – – 0 12
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – r r r r, c r r, c – – – – – 0 12
C 3 Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – r r – r, c r, c c – – 0 7
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – – – r, c – c – 0 5
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – – r – – – – 0 9
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – r r – r, c - r – – 0 10
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – r r r r r – – – – 0 11
Stack 2 D 5 Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – r r r r r - 0 0
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – r r – – 0 0
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – r r r – – 0 0
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – r r – – 0 0
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 9
E 2 Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – c r, c r, c r, c r – – 0 10
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – r r r, c r r – – 0 8
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – – r r, c r, c – – 0 0
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – – r r r c – 0 0
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – - r r r r – 0 0
F 7 Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – r - r r r, c – 0 0
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – r - r, c r, c r, c – 0 0
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – r - r r r – 0 0
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – - - r, c r, c r, c c 0 6
Aerosol, fecal – – – – – – – – – – – – r r – – 0 7
Room 2 G 6 Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 9
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 0
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 8
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 0
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 3
Trial 2—with trays between cages rRT-PCR (DPI) HI log2
(DPI)
Cage Handling order Contact type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 14
Stack 1 A 1 Aerosol – – – – – – – r r r r r – – – c 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – r r r – – – – 0 11
Aerosol – – † 0 -
Aerosol – – – – – – r – r, c r ,c r, c c – – c c 0 11
Aerosol – – – – – – r † 0 -
Z 4 Inoculated – – – – – – r – – – r – – – – – 0 11
Inoculated – r r r r r – – – – - – – r – – 0 10
Inoculated – – r r, c – c r, c - c c c – – – – c 0 12
Inoculated – r r r r r – – – – – – – – – – 0 11
Inoculated – r r r - r – – – – – – – – – – 0 11
B 8 Aerosol – – – – – – – – r r r – – r – – 0 12
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – c – – – r r r 0 7
Aerosol – – – – – – – – r c r, c r – – – – 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – r r r r, c r – 0 7
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – r r r – r c r 0 11
C 3 Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – r, c r – – – – 0 6
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r 0 7
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r r 0 8
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – r r r, c r, c – – c c 0 11
Stack 2 D 5 Aerosol – – – – – – – – – r r r – r, c r, c r, c 0 9
Aerosol – – – – – – – – r r r – – c c c 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – r r – r – r – – 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – r – r – r 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – r r – r – – 0 0
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Table 1 (continued)
Trial 2—without trays between cages rRT-PCR (DPI) HI log2
(DPI)
Cage Handling order Contact type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 14
E 2 Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r 0 9
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – r – r, c 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r r 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – c r 0 10
F 7 Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – r – r 0 7
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – c – r – r 0 8
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – – – – – r r 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – r – r r r, c c 0 10
Aerosol – – – – – – – – – – r, c c c 0 9
Room 2 G 6 Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 10
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 0
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 7
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 6
Handling only – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 0 6
A positive rRT-PCR oropharyngeal sample is noted by an “r” and a positive rRT-PCR cloacal samples is noted by a “c.” Birds that died before the end of the trial is noted by a “†”.
21K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27chickens necropsied on day 16 for both trials. In trial 1, there were six
chickens with yolk peritonitis, two with pale kidneys, four with
regressing ova, and one with lung congestion. In trial 2, there were
seven chickens with airsaculitis, two with hepatomegaly, two with
lung congestion, and one with yolk peritonitis. There was no detected
correlation between the appearance of lesions and virus shedding
patterns, although the types of lesions were similar to those observed
in commercial egg-laying chickens infected with H6N2 AIV in
California (Kinde et al., 2003). During trial 2, a chicken located in
cage A died on day 3 and another on day 9. There were no signiﬁcant
lesions observed in the chicken that died on day 3. Pale kidneys and
splenomegaly were observed in the chicken that died on day 9. No
signiﬁcant lesions were observed in 15 and nine chickens in trials 1
and 2, respectively.
Table 1 shows the daily number of AIV-infected chickens detected
by rRT-PCR and their HI responses prior to inoculation and 14 daysFig. 1. Experimental design for transmission of LPAIV H6N2 between chickepost-inoculation (DPI) in both trials. Neither AIV nor AIV antibodies
were detected prior to inoculation of the index birds. In trial 1 (no
trays between cages), AIV was ﬁrst detected in the inoculated birds
(cage Z) 2 DPI, and 4 DPI in chickens in cage B. In trial 2 (trays between
cages), AIV was ﬁrst detected in the inoculated birds (cage Z) 1 DPI,
and 6 DPI in chickens in cage A. AIV was detected in the inoculated
birds for 4–8 and 5–9 days for trials 1 and 2, respectively. In exposed
chickens located in cages A-E, AIV was detected for 3–8 days in trials 1
and 2. The daily median and range of virus particle numbers detected
are shown in Fig. 2. In trial 1, 102–103 virus particles were detected
from at least one bird in every cage in room 1. An estimated 103.6 virus
particles were the most detected in any bird in trial 1. In trial 2, 106
virus particles were detected in a bird in cage C once and 105.5 virus
particles was detected in an inoculated bird once. In the remaining
ﬁve cages in room 1, 102–103 virus particles were detected from at
least one bird in every cage.ns in stacked cages labeled A–G. The handling order is numbered 1–8.
Table 2
Median time to detection andmultiple comparisons results for all cages in trials 1 and 2.
Cage Number of
chickens/cage
Median time to
detection (days)
Range (days) Mean rank
Trial 1: no trays between cages
A 5 8.0 7–9 10.50αβ
B 5 5.0 4–7 3.20α
C 5 8.0 7–12 13.00αβ
D 5 11.0 10–12 24.90β
E 5 11.0 9–11 19.80β
F 5 10.0 10–12 22.10β
G 5 N/A — —
Trial 2: trays between cages
A 4⁎ 7.0 7–9 4.88 α
B 5 9.0 8–10 9.70 α
C 5 14.0 8–15 19.90 αβ
D 5 9.0 6–11 10.00 αβ
E 5 14.0 13–14 24.40 β
F 5 13.0 11–14 19.10 αβ
G 5 N/A — —
Mean ranks without a superscript in common are signiﬁcantly different with a 5% level
of signiﬁcance over all comparisons using the nonparametric multiple comparison
procedure. ⁎Cage A, one bird died on day 2 of the experiment, another chicken died on
day 9, after AIV detection by RT-PCR.
22 K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27The median ﬁrst detection by rRT-PCR was 9 and 10 DPI for birds in
trials 1 (without trays) and 2 (with trays between the cages),
respectively. In both trials, AIVwas detected in 29 of the non-inoculated
birds housed in room 1; however, this occurred 3 days earlier in trial 1
than in trial 2. The Peto-Gehan Wilcoxon test comparing the time to
detection in trial 1 and trial 2 was non-signiﬁcant (p=0.071).
All sequences were compared to A/turkey/Massachusetts/3740/
1965. There was no differences in the amino acid sequences of A/
chicken/CA/1255/2002(H6N2) andeight samples from this study (ﬁve
from trial 1 and 2 from trial 2). The HA cleavage site amino acid
sequence in all the sample sequences and A/chicken/CA/1255/2002
(H6N2)was PQIATR↓G. This cleavage sitewas PQIETR↓G for A/chicken/
California/431/2000 (H6N2). Amino acids at position 222 have beenFig. 2. Median and range of estimated virus particexperimentally shown to play a role in sialic acid cell receptor recog-
nition for H6 viruses (Gambaryan et al., 2008). All HA amino acid
sequences from samples, A/chicken/California/431/2000 and A/
chicken/CA/1255/2002 have Val222. There were three differences in
the nucleotide sequences from the experimental samples that trans-
lated into amino acid changes at positions 60, 73 and 206.Most samples
had Cys60 except for two samples from birds housed in stack one and
one sample from a bird housed in stack 2 in trial 1 had Gly60. All
sequenced samples from trial 1 and three samples from trial 2 had
Cys73. Four samples from trial 2 (three in stack 1 andone in stack 2) had
Ser73. One sample in trial 2 had Val206 and all other samples had
Ala206. There were no statistical difference between the number of
oropharyngeal and cloacal samples thathadGly60 or Cys60 (p=0.494).
Comparison of AIV detection by rRT-PCR among the cages-trial 1
To evaluate the impact of fecal exposure on transmission to the
birds in lower cages, trays were not placed between the cages in this
trial. In this trial, the ﬁrst AIV transmission was detected in cage B,
located directly beneath cage Z containing the inoculated birds
(Fig. 1). Time to detection was signiﬁcantly different (p=0.001) by
cage (Table 2). Pairwise comparisons of time to AIV detection in each
cage showed that detection of AIV in cage B (median=5.0 DPI) was
signiﬁcantly earlier than in cages located in the adjacent stack (cage D
median=11.0 DPI; cage E median=11.0 DPI; and cage F median=
10.0 DPI). Median time to detection for cage B was earlier than, but
not signiﬁcantly different from, cages located within the same stack
(cages A and C median=8.0 DPI). No AIV was detected by rRT-PCR in
birds located in the room 2 (cage G), which were handled after the
index case and other subsequently infected birds, although antibodies
were detected in two chickens in cage G at 14 DPI.
Comparison of AIV detection by rRT-PCR among the cages-trial 2
Trays were placed below the cages in trial 2 to evaluate the effect
of eliminating fecal exposure to birds located below other cages.les (log10) detected for all rRT-PCR samples.
23K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27Median time to detection for the chickens grouped by cages differed
signiﬁcantly (p=0.002, df=5). The ﬁrst detection of AIV by rRT-PCR
was in a chicken housed in the top cage of the second stack (cage D).
Pairwise comparisons of time to AIV detection for each cage showed
that detection of AIV in cage A, located directly above the inoculated
birds (median=7.0 DPI), was signiﬁcantly earlier than that for birds
in cage E (median=14.0 DPI), located directly across from the
inoculated birds. No other comparisons were statistically signiﬁcantly
different. No AIV was detected by rRT-PCR in birds located in room 2
(cage G), although antibodies were detected in four chickens in cage G
on 14 DPI.
AIV transmission in room 1
Detection of AIV was signiﬁcantly earlier in chickens housed in the
same stack as inoculated birds (stack 1) than in birds housed in the
adjacent stack (stack 2) in both trials (pb0.001 and p=0.031 for trials
1 and 2, respectively) (Fig. 3). The time to detection by rRT-PCR forFig. 3. Daily proportion of chickens in room 1 wstack 1 in trial 1 was signiﬁcantly earlier than AIV detection in stack 1
during trial 2 (p=0.017). A statistical comparison of time to detection
in stack 2 in trials 1 and 2 was performed in two steps as the rRT-PCR
detection curves intersect at day 11, and the intersection of the
detection curves violates the test assumptions that the differences in
these curves areproportional. Time todetection in stack2 fordays 1–10
was not signiﬁcantly different between trials 1 and 2 (p=0.154). Time
to detection in stack 2 for days 11–15was signiﬁcantly earlier for trial 1
than trial 2 (p=0.037).
Fecal exposure
There was a non-signiﬁcant difference (p=0.068) in time to
detection by rRT-PCR between the two trials using theWilcoxon rank-
sum test. In trial 1 time to detection was compared for cages that had
0, 1, and 2 cages physically above them with birds potentially
shedding AIV (Table 3). Cages A and D did not have fecal exposure.
Cage E was considered as having no fecal exposure since AIV was notith no detectable AIV infection by RT-PCR.
Table 3
Median time to AIV detection and Kruskal–Wallis mean rank scores for groups based on
their fecal exposure.
Fecal exposure
level
Number of
susceptible chickens
Median time to
detection (DPI)
Range
(DPI)
Mean rank
Trial 1: no trays between cages
None
(A, D, E) 15 10.0 7–16 18.23
One cage above
(B, F) 10 8.5 5–12 12.65
Two cages above
(C) 5 8.0 7–12 13.00
Trial 2: trays between cages
A, D, E 14 10.0 6–16 13.69
B, F 10 10.0 8–14 14.40
C 5 14.0 8–15 19.90
Trial 1, p=0.228, df=2. Trial 2, p=0.355, df=2.
24 K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27detected in chickens in the cage above it (cage D) prior to the chickens
in cage E. Cages B and F each had one cage with AIV-positive chickens
above them prior to shedding virus (Fig. 1). There were two cages
above cage C in which AIV was detected prior to chickens in cage C.
Median time to AIV detection in cageswith no fecal exposure (cages A,
D and E) were not signiﬁcantly different (p=0.228) than time to AIV
detection in cages that had fecal exposure (cages B, C and F).
Comparing the same groups (cages A, D, E vs. cages B, C, and F) in trial
2, there was also no signiﬁcant difference (p=0.355) in time to
detection between the two groups of cages.
Expected and observed patterns of transmission by handling
There was no detectable pattern of AIV transmission by handling
infected chickens prior to susceptible chickens in either trial in
room 2. When analyzing median times to detection grouped by cage
in room 1, the mean ranking scores for the cages did not follow the
order of handling. Additionally, chickens handled before infected/
inoculated chickens did not have higher mean ranks than those
handled after infectious/inoculated chickens. In trial 1, where trays
were not present between the cages, those in the same stack as
inoculated birds (cages A, B, and C) had lower median times to
detection than the other stack of cages. In trial 2, where trays were
placed between the cages, those cages that were closest to inoculated
birds (cages A, B and D) had lower median times to detection than
the other cages in the same room. No AIV was detected by rRT-PCR in
chickens placed in room 2 (cage G), which were handled after
inoculated and subsequently infected birds; however, antibodies
were detected in two and four birds in trials 1 and 2, respectively, in
cage G at 14 DPI, indicating there was some transmission of AIV
between birds by handling alone.
Discussion
Our results illustrate differences in AIV transmission by different
exposure routes of H6N2 AIV, which caused outbreaks in Southern
California poultry in 2000–2005 (Kinde et al., 2003; Shivaprasad et al.,
2004;Woolcock, Suarez, and Kuney, 2003). Since the characteristics of
different AIV subtypes and genotypes are so diverse, repetition of this
experiment could yield different results. However, our results indicate
that aerosol exposure is an important mode of AIV transmission
among chickens in LBM settings. In both trials, cages in closest
proximity to the inoculated chickens, or housedwithin the same stack
of cages as the inoculated chickens, had the lowest median detection
time. The direction of the air exchange rates direction did not appear
to have an effect on AIV transmission in this experiment. In a separate
transmission experiment conducted using the same virus (Yee,
Cardona, and Carpenter, 2009), the air ﬂow was in the oppositedirection to that in this experiment and there were no detectable
differences in AIV transmission between the two studies.
Among the rRT-PCR-positive samples selected for virus isolation
and HA gene sequencing, there were no signiﬁcant genetic or amino
acid sequence changes associated with receptor binding. There are
two amino acids that differ between trials 1 and 2 at positions 60 and
73. These amino acid positions are not known to be involved in cell
receptor recognition and the signiﬁcance of these differences are not
known. Four of the seven samples selected for full-length HA
sequencing had Ser73 that was not found in any sample sequences
from trial 1, nor Ser73 found in samples collected from chickens
infected through direct contact in another transmission study with
the same virus (Yee, Cardona, and Carpenter, 2009). This difference in
the sampled viruses between trials 1 and 2 may be related to
differences in transmission characteristics between the two trials.
In a study conducted by Gambaryan et al. (2008), Ala222 in H6
viruses was demonstrated to have a major role in binding to duck,
gull, and chicken sialic acid receptors. The virus used in this study, A/
chicken/California/1772/02(H6N2), and the viruses used in the
amino acid alignment, A/chicken/California/431/2000(H6N2) and
A/chicken/CA/1255/2002(H6N2), have Val222. Although consis-
tently found, this change to a similar (non-bulky) amino acid, may
have limited impact on function (Gambaryan et al., 2008) and because
it is consistently found in the inoculating virus, viruses of the same
lineage and in viruses isolated in both trials, there are no indications
that this amino acid change was selected in this trial. The amino acids
in cleavage sites for the virus used in this experiment and A/chicken/
CA/1255/2002(H6N2) also differs from contemporary Asian-origin
strains of H6N2 and A/chicken/California/431/2000(H6N2) substi-
tuting alanine for glutamic acid (Chin et al., 2002). A single change in
the amino acid composition of the cleavage site appeared consistently
in the viruses isolated from birds to which there was likely fecal
transmission suggesting it may have been selected by the route of
transmission, although this could not be established with the design
of the current study. Further studies to experimentally examine the
role of this change in viral transmission, tropism and shedding
patterns are planned.
Previous studies on the transmission of AIV in turkeys did not result
in detectable transmission between turkeys in different cages
(Samadieh and Bankowski, 1971). Based on results of that study and
others (Perez et al., 2003; Samadieh andBankowski, 1971; vanderGoot
et al., 2003),we didnot expect aerosol exposure to be themajor vehicle
of AIV transmission among chickens in this experiment. Some
experimental replications by van der Goot et al. using LPAIV, A/
Chicken/Pennsylvania/21525/83 (H5N2) did not result in trans-
mission to chickens in direct contact with inoculated birds (van der
Goot et al., 2003). Results of previous AIV indirect contact transmission
studies between Japanese quail and chickens have beenmixed. Perez et
al., in their studies of Asian H9N2 AIVs, observed transmission of A/
Quail/Hong Kong/A28945/88 (H9N2) to susceptible quail and chick-
ens as a result of fecal but not aerosol exposure (Perez et al., 2003). It is
possible that transmission of the AIV subtypes studied by Perez would
have been observed if the experiment were extended beyond 7 days
post-inoculation, as we observed AIV transmission within 6–14 DPI in
birds with aerosol exposure only.
The effect of fecal transmission was difﬁcult to assess because the
differences in time to detection between the two trials (p=0.071)
and the comparison of trials 1 and 2 for the chickens housed in room
1 (p=0.068) were marginally non-signiﬁcant. However, daily AIV
prevalence was always higher in trial 1 than in trial 2, suggesting that
fecal exposure did result in transmission to susceptible birds, or it
resulted in the exposure of birds to more virus, which may extend
their periods of shedding and the amount of virus shed (C. J. Cardona,
unpublished data). Additionally, the initial transmission beyond cage
Z (inoculated birds) in trial 1 (no trays) implied that fecal exposure
played an important role since it occurred in a chicken located
25K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27directly below the index cases (cage B), whereas in trial 2 (trays
placed between the cages), AIV spread was ﬁrst detected in a cage
located above the inoculated birds (cage A). Based on our results
comparing the Kaplan–Meier survival curves of AIV detection by rRT-
PCR in room 1, it appears that placing trays between cages, thus
preventing fecal exposure, delayed transmission between cages
within the same stack. AIV detection in chickens housed in the
stack of cages adjacent to the inoculated birds (stack 2) was very
different in trial 1 than in trial 2. While there were no signiﬁcant
differences in AIV detection for the ﬁrst 10 days in stack 2 in either
trial (p=0.154), detection of AIV 10 DPI was signiﬁcantly earlier in
trial 1 than in trial 2 and may explain the marginally non-signiﬁcant
results between the trials.
The purpose of the handling assessment was to determine the role
of fomites in the spread of AIV among chickens in an LBM. This study
suggests that fomites commonly used in LBMs may play a role in
transmission of AIV, which may go undetected by active surveillance
efforts for some period of time using rRT-PCR only. We observed
evidence of mechanical transfer of H6N2 AIV by handling infectious
birds prior to handling susceptible birds housed in another room
within the 16-day time period. There was no difference in detection
time by rRT-PCR of chickens following the handling pattern, nor was
there a difference in detection time in birds within the room that were
handled prior to the inoculated/infectious birds and birds handled
after the inoculated/infectious birds. Since infectionwas only detected
by antibody response in room 2, it was not possible to determinemore
closely when AIV infection occurred in these chickens.
In the Tiwari et al. (2006) experiment, 102–103 virus particles
were found on contaminated non-porous materials. Previous experi-
ments using a different genotype of H6N2 AIV have shown that fewer
than 106 EID50/ml will not consistently cause an infection as detected
by rRT-PCR in intranasally inoculated chickens (C.J. Cardona,
unpublished data). These previous experiments support our results
in which AIV was not detected in the chickens housed in room 2 by
rRT-PCR, but infection was detected by antibody response. It is
possible that there was an insufﬁcient dose of virus on the gloves,
apron, and boots to transmit and produce a fulminant infection
resulting in shedding that could be detected by rRT-PCR. These results
are useful since active surveillance in LBMs are conducted using rRT-
PCR on oropharyngeal and cloacal swab samples (Yee et al., 2008). It is
unknown if these birds could play a part in spreading AIV to other
susceptible birds, and increasing the frequency of cleaning these
fomites may prevent or reduce AIV transmission through this route.
While the placement of trays below the cages did not prevent the
spread of AIV between birds in room 1, using trays may nonetheless
have a signiﬁcant effect on reducing viral spread within LBMs.
Chickens usually spend from 1 to 7 days in an LBM in Southern
California, while shipments of new birds to a market arrive 2–7 times
per week (Yee et al., 2008). Therefore, if there is an infection in the
market, the number of initial susceptible and infectious birds present
is not ﬁxed as it was in our experimental study.
Data and ﬁndings from this analysis can be used in a mathematical
model to quantify the probability and rate of LPAIV transmission.
Parameters from this model can then be used in simulation models
to determine the spread and possible persistence of H6N2 AIV in
LBM settings. These simulation models can account for the physical
layout of an LBM, exposure routes, and the constant cycling of
additions (by supplier deliveries) and removal (by custom slaughter
sales) of birds, which are all variables that can affect disease
transmission. A simulation model can also evaluate the effectiveness
of control and prevention strategies, such as active surveillance, by
estimating the frequency and number of swabs necessary to detect
infection in a given period of time post-exposure, or the frequency of
“day of rest” cleaning and depopulation activities that are conducted
in LBMs in Hong Kong and Southern California (Kung et al., 2003;
Yee et al., 2008).Materials and methods
Virus
The virus used to inoculate birds in this study, A/chicken/
California/1772/02, H6N2 (hereafter referred to as H6N2 AIV), was
isolated from commercial egg laying chickens in Southern California
in 2002. A closely related strain, A/Quail/California/KSY1031/2005,
H6N2, was isolated from an outbreak in Southern California LBM in
2005 (K.S. Yee, unpublished data).
Animals
Birds were acquired through an LBM poultry supplier in California.
The supplier participates in active and passive surveillance for AIV as a
part of the California Custom Slaughter LPAIV Control Program (Yee
et al., 2008). There were no AIV infections detected in any of the
supplier's ﬂocks immediately prior to or during the experimental
period (C.J. Cardona, unpublished data.). Each of the chicken strains
used in this experiment are of the types and strains sold in California
LBMs (Yee et al., 2008) and were market age at the time of placement.
Brown pullets (n=10) and roosters (n=5) were 8–24 weeks of age
and broiler hens (n=25 in each trial) were 6–8 weeks of age.
Experimental procedures
The equipment used and feeding, watering, and lighting schedules
were based on the most common practices in Southern California
LBMs (Yee et al., 2008). Collectively, thirty susceptible chickens
were placed ﬁve to a cage (cages A through F) in the same room
(room 1), together with ﬁve inoculated chickens in another cage
(cage Z) for a total of seven cages. Individual cages were arranged as
two stacks of four cages, with stacks approximately six inches apart.
One cage located on the bottom right was left empty. Broiler hens
were placed in cages A, B, E, and F, brown pullets were placed in
cage C, and roosters were placed in cage D (Fig. 1). Each cage
measured 36q×18q×18q, and chickens in one cage did not have
direct beak-to-beak contact with birds placed in other cages.
Additionally, ﬁve broiler hens were placed in one cage (cage G)
isolated in another room (room 2) to determine the role of fomites
alone in transmission.
The ﬁrst trial was conducted without trays between stacked cages.
After a complete cleaning and disinfection of the room, cages, and
fomites, a second trial was conducted with trays inserted between the
stacked cages. At the beginning of each trial, the ﬁve brown pullets in
cage Z, located second from the top in the stack of four cages, were
removed from their cage and inoculated intranasally with 107 EID50 of
H6N2 AIV on day 1 in room 1 (shown in Fig. 1). The inoculated birds
were immediately placed back into cage Z. Each bird in both trials was
observed daily for clinical signs of disease. Necropsy was performed
on the day of death if birds died before the end of the experiment, and
on day 16 on all remaining birds.
During the trials, handlers wore a hycar rubber apron, rubber
gloves, and rubber boots, which were stored in room 1 where the
birds in the stacked cages were kept. This was designed to simulate
handling conditions that occur in southern California LBMs, and the
protective clothing were intended to serve as fomites for transferring
AIV between the cages, rooms, and individual birds. Oropharyngeal
and cloacal swab samples were collected daily from all birds for
16 days. Blood was collected from each bird at days 0 and 14. The
order of sample collection by cage numberwas: A, E, C, Z, D, G, F, and B
(shown in Fig. 1). Thus, three cages of chickens (cages A, E, and C)
were handled prior to handling the inoculated chickens (cage Z).
Samples were collected from each caged group using an order that
could be distinguished from the expected patterns of spread between
cages via fecal and aerosol routes of transmission.
26 K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27There were three patterns of AIV detection expected if handling
the birds effectively spread the virus. One expected pattern was that
AIV would be detected in birds that were handled after the inoculated
birds, but before the birds were handled prior to handling the
inoculated birds (i.e., median time to detection for cages A, E, and C
would be greater than cages D, G, F and B). The second expected
pattern was that AIV detection would follow the handling order, so
that cage D would have the lowest median time to detection, followed
by cages G, F, and B. The third expected pattern was that the birds
located in room 2 would become infected, since they were handled
after the inoculated birds were handled.
In room 1, birds placed at the top of the stacks, and those in trial 2
(in which trays were placed between the cages) were exposed via
aerosol exposure, but had no fecal exposure. Birds placed in room 2
were isolated from those in room 1 and had handler contact (a
technician wearing the same apron, gloves, and boots) but no fecal or
aerosol exposure. During both trials, technicians were unaware of the
identity and location of the index cases.
RT-PCR and sequence analyses
All samples were tested for virus with real-time (r) RT-PCR
following themethods published by Spackman et al. (2003). The same
rRT-PCR test was run on known dilutions of the challenge virus to
establish a standard curve that could be used to quantitate the
number of virus particles in positive samples.
Virus isolation and HA sequence analyses
Fifteen rRT-PCR-positive samples were selected for full-length
sequencing of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene. Eight rRT-PCR-positive
samples from trial 1 and seven samples from trial 2 were selected for
virus isolation. At least one sample from at least one chicken in each
cage was selected to determine genotypic associated with adaptation,
and the site of virus shedding (oropharyngeal and/or cloacal). Virus
was grown and detected following standard methods (Swayne et al.,
1998). Nine to 11 days old SPF chicken embryos (Charles River
Laboratories, North Franklin CT) were inoculated with 150 μl of virus
sample and incubated at approximately 37 °C for 72 h. The allantoic
ﬂuid was harvested after the embryos were chilled at 4 °C overnight
and tested for hemagglutinating activity using 0.5% chicken red blood
cells.
Viral RNA was extracted from the allantoic ﬂuid harvested from
infected embryonating chicken eggs using the Qiagen Viral RNA
mini extraction kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) according to the
manufacturer's instructions. A two step RT-PCR was used to amplify
the HA gene. RNA was transcribed using 0.5 μl (1 μg/μl) of Uni12
primer 5′-AGCAAAGCAGG-3′, 7 μl of viral RNA and incubating at
70 °C for 5 min and chilled to 4 °C. The reverse transcription
reaction was ampliﬁed at 25 °C for 10 min and followed by
extension at 42 °C for 1.5 h by MLV polymerase (Invitrogen,
Carlsbad, CA) with the addition of dNTPs and RNase inhibitor. The
reaction was terminated at 75 °C for 10 min at the end of the cDNA
preparation step.
The full-length individual inﬂuenza genes were ampliﬁed using
TaKaRa Taq PCR system (TaKaRa, Japan) according to manufacturer's
protocol. For full-length HA genes from the cDNAwere ampliﬁed with
the HA gene speciﬁc primer described previously in Hoffmann et al.
(2001) with modiﬁcations. Two internal H6 primers H6-576F (5′-
TAYTTCTGGGGKGTRCAYCATCCW-3′) and H6-1098R (5′-ATTTTCA-
TGRTGRTARCCATACCA-3′) were used to sequence the middle section
of the HA gene. The ampliﬁed samples and primers were submitted to
an outside facility for sequencing (Davis Sequencing, Davis, CA). The
gene segments were assembled and consensus sequences were
generated using VectorNTI ContigExpress in Invitrogen VectorNTI
Advance 10 (Carlsbad, CA).Nucleotide and amino acid sequences from all 15 viruses were
aligned with the HA genes of A/chicken/California/431/2000(H6N2),
A/chicken/CA/1255/2002 (H6N2), and A/turkey/Massachusetts/
3740/1965(H6N2) in Geneious Pro (version 4.6.5, Biomatters Ltd,
Auckland, New Zealand).
Serology
Hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) tests on blood samples were
conducted using standard methods to conﬁrm AIV-infection status
prior to inoculation and at the end of the study period (World
Organisation for Animal Health, 2005). Hemagglutination inhibition
serum titers of 1:8 or greater were considered positive.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics were performed on the day of ﬁrst detection
of AIV by rRT-PCR for birds in each cage. Times to detection for
inoculated birds were not included in the analysis. The Wilcoxon
rank-sum test was performed to compare median time to ﬁrst
detection by rRT-PCR between the two trials in SPSS (Release 10.0.0,
September 1999). Kruskal–Wallis, a non-parametric analysis of
variance procedure for ranked data, was used to test differences in
time to detection by rRT-PCR of AIV between comparison groups
(Kruskal andWallis, Dec 1952). The mean rank of time to infection for
each cage was compared to determine if there was a pattern of AIV
spread among chickens, based on their proximity to inoculated birds
or exposure type. Chickens were also grouped by their exposure to
fecal material to assess differences in transmission times between
birds with one, two, or no cage(s) of chickens shedding AIV above
them. The non-parametric Bonferroni–Dunn procedure was used to
identify signiﬁcant (αb0.05 overall comparisons) group comparisons
following each signiﬁcant Kruskal–Wallis test (Daniel, 1990).
Life-tables and survival curves using the Kaplan–Meier method
were created in R software (version 2.7.0) using the ﬁrst day of
detection by rRT-PCR for each bird to evaluate if the rate of
transmission was signiﬁcantly different given physical proximity to
inoculated birds and fecal exposure. The statistical signiﬁcance of time
to AIV detection by rRT-PCR between birds in trials 1 and 2, as well as
the differences in AIV detection between birds housed in each stack of
cages in room 1, were evaluated using Peto-Gehan Wilcoxon of
Kaplan–Meier survival curves (Harrington and Fleming, 1982).
Acknowledgments
We thank Drs. Jinling Li and Zeng-Qi Yang for their laboratory
guidance and for performing the HI tests. We also thank Nicole L.
Anchell, Nguyet Dao, Phuong Dao, and Sara Leisgang for providing
technical and laboratory support. This work was supported by the
Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS) at the
University of California Davis and funding was provided by the Avian
Inﬂuenza Coordinated Agricultural Project, USDA/CSREES grant 2005-
35605-15388, “The Prevention and Control of Avian Inﬂuenza in the
United States.”
References
Alexander, D.J., Allan, W.H., Parsons, D.G., Parsons, G., 1978. The pathogenicity of four
avian inﬂuenza viruses for fowls, turkeys and ducks. Res. Vet. Sci. 24 (2), 242–247.
Alexander, D.J., Parsons, G., Manvell, R.J., 1986. Experimental assessment of the
pathogenicity of eight avian inﬂuenza A viruses of H5 subtype for chickens, turkeys,
ducks, and quail. Avian. Pathol. 15, 647–666.
Cardona, C.J., Xing, Z., Sandrock, C.E., Davis, C.E., 2009. Avian inﬂuenza in birds and
mammals. Comp. Immunol. Microbiol. Infect. Dis. 32 (4), 255–273.
Chin, P.S., Hoffmann, E., Webby, R., Webster, R.G., Guan, Y., Peiris, M., Shortridge, K.F.,
2002. Molecular evolution of H6 inﬂuenza viruses from poultry in Southeastern
China: prevalence of H6N1 inﬂuenza viruses possessing seven A/Hong Kong/156/
97 (H5N1)-like genes in poultry. J. Virol. 76 (2), 507–516.
27K.S. Yee et al. / Virology 394 (2009) 19–27Daniel, W., 1990. Multiple comparisons. 2nd ed. In qApplied Nonparametric Statisticsq.
PWS-KENT, Boston.
Gambaryan, A.S., Tuzikov, A.B., Pazynina, G.V., Desheva, J.A., Bovin, N.V., Matrosovich,
M.N., Klimov, A.I., 2008. 6-sulfo sialyl Lewis X is the common receptor determinant
recognized by H5, H6, H7 and H9 inﬂuenza viruses of terrestrial poultry. Virol. J. 5,
85.
Harrington, D.P., Fleming, T.R., 1982. A class of rank test procedures for censored
survival data. Biometrika 69, 553–566.
Hoffmann, E., Stech, J., Guan, Y., Webster, R.G., Perez, D.R., 2001. Universal primer set for
the full-length ampliﬁcation of all inﬂuenza A viruses. Arch. Virol. 146 (12),
2275–2289.
Kinde, H., Read, D.H., Daft, B.M., Hammarlund, M., Moore, J., Uzal, F., Mukai, J., Woolcock,
P., 2003. The occurrence of avian inﬂuenza A subtype H6N2 in commercial layer
ﬂocks in Southern California (2000–02): clinicopathologic ﬁndings. Avian. Dis. 47
(3 Suppl), 1214–1218.
Kruskal, W., Wallis, W., Dec 1952. Use of ranks in one-criterion variance analysis. J. Am.
Stat. Assoc. 47 (260), 583–621.
Kung, N.Y., Guan, Y., Perkins, N.R., Bissett, L., Ellis, T., Sims, L., Morris, R.S., Shortridge, K.F.,
Peiris, J.S., 2003. The impact of a monthly rest day on avian inﬂuenza virus isolation
rates in retail live poultrymarkets inHong Kong. Avian. Dis. 47 (3 Suppl.), 1037–1041.
Lu, H., Castro, A.E., 2004. Evaluation of the infectivity, length of infection, and immune
response of a low-pathogenicity H7N2 avian inﬂuenza virus in speciﬁc-pathogen-
free chickens. Avian. Dis. 48 (2), 263–270.
Perez, D.R., Lim, W., Seiler, J.P., Yi, G., Peiris, M., Shortridge, K.F., Webster, R.G., 2003.
Role of quail in the interspecies transmission of H9 inﬂuenza A viruses: molecular
changes on HA that correspond to adaptation from ducks to chickens. J. Virol. 77
(5), 3148–3156.
Samadieh, B., Bankowski, R.A., 1971. Transmissibility of avian inﬂuenza-A viruses. Am. J.
Vet. Res. 32 (6), 939–945.
Senne, D., Pearson, J.E., Panigrahy, B., 1992. Proc. 3rd International Symposium on Avian
Inﬂuenza. Madison, WI.Shivaprasad, H., Charlton, B., Sommer, F., Cooper, G., Crespo, R., Woolcock, P., Castellan,
D.M., 2004. Avian inﬂuenza H6N2 in California broiler chickens and turkeys-2002.
q53rd Western Poultry Disease Conferenceq.
Spackman, E., Senne, D.A., Bulaga, L.L., Myers, T.J., Perdue, M.L., Garber, L.P., Lohman, K.,
Daum, L.T., Suarez, D.L., 2003. Development of real-time RT-PCR for the detection of
avian inﬂuenza virus. Avian. Dis. 47 (3 Suppl.), 1079–1082.
Swayne, D., Halvorson, D.A., 2003. Inﬂuenza, In: Saif, Y., Barnes, H., Glisson, J., Fadly, A.,
McDougald, L., Swayne, D. (Eds.), 11 ed. "Diseases of Poultry". Iowa State Press,
Ames, IA, pp. 135–160.
Swayne, D., Senne, D., Beard, C., 1998. Avian inﬂuenza. In: Swayne, G.F., DE, Jackwood
MW, Pearson, JE, Reed, WM, Reed, WM (Eds.), qLaboratory manual for the isolation
and identiﬁcation of avian pathogensq. American Association of Avian Pathologists,
Kennett Square (PA, pp. 150–155.
Tiwari, A., Patnayak, D.P., Chander, Y., Parsad, M., Goyal, S.M., 2006. Survival of two
avian respiratory viruses on porous and nonporous surfaces. Avian. Dis. 50 (2),
284–287.
van der Goot, J.A., de Jong, M.C., Koch, G., Van Boven, M., 2003. Comparison of the
transmission characteristics of low and high pathogenicity avian inﬂuenza A virus
(H5N2). Epidemiol. Infect. 131 (2), 1003–1013.
Webster, R.G., 2004. Wet markets—a continuing source of severe acute respiratory
syndrome and inﬂuenza? Lancet 363 (9404), 234–236.
Woolcock, P.R., Suarez, D.L., Kuney, D., 2003. Low-pathogenicity avian inﬂuenza virus
(H6N2) in chickens in California, 2000–02. Avian. Dis. 47 (3 Suppl.), 872–881.
World Organisation for Animal Health, 2005. Chapter 2.7.12: Avian Inﬂuenza. In: OIE
(Ed.), qManual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestial Animalsq. OIE.
Yee, K.S., Carpenter, T.E., Mize, S., Cardona, C.J., 2008. The live bird market system and
low-pathogenic avian inﬂuenza prevention in Southern California. Avian. Dis. 52
(2), 348–352.
Yee, K.S., Cardona, C.J., Carpenter, T.E., 2009. Transmission of low-pathogenicity avian
inﬂuenza virus of subtype H6N2 from chickens to Pekin ducks and Japanese quail
(Coturnix coturnix japonica). Avian. Pathol. 38 (1), 59–64.
